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THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE
THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE REVISITED
PETER DAVID BLANCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1919, the Journal of Ciminal Law and Criminology published an
article by George Everson, titled "The Human Element in Justice."'
In that article, Everson described an empirical research project exam-
ining variations in over 150,000 cases by forty-one New York City mag-
istrates in their determinations of guilt and sentencing.2 Among
other conclusions, Everson identified what he called the "remarkable
degree" to which the disposal of cases reflected the temperament and
personality ofjudges.3 Everson described the richness and complexity
of the "appearance ofjustice" for the judges studied:
The warm human attributes of our ministers ofjustice .... their peculiar-
ides of temperament, their chance of prejudice, their warm open-
heartedness or their petty tyrannies, their leniencies or their severities
are all supposed to be charmed away by the donning of judicial robes
and the justice they dispense is supposed to be an abstract thing as im-
mutable as the law of gravitation.
4
Everson believed his findings "startling" because the "appearance
of justice" seemed to revolve more around the personality of the
judges examined than any legally principled approach they may em-
ploy in implementing the law.5 Everson concluded that, regardless of
* Professor of Law and of Psychology, University of Iowa; J.D., 1986, Stanford Law
School; Ph.D., 1982, Harvard University. Senior Fellow, The Annenberg Washington Pro-
gram; Fellow, Domestic Policy Institute, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University,
1994. Daniel Lord, Randy Merritt, Julie Ott, Eileen Strejc, Ellen Szarleta, and Sheila
Woodward provided helpful research support.
1 George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIzmIOLOGY 90
(1919).
2 Id. at 96-98.
3 Id. at 98.
4 Id. at 90.
5 Id. at 99. "Empirical research has shown that significant variation exists in the deci-
sions made by courts functioning within differentjurisdictions, despite similarities in court
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the actual law, much of its enforcement depended solely upon the
judges' particular attitudes toward the allegedly guilty party.
6
Much has changed, of course, in the appearance and the reality
of the administration of justice in the more than seventy-five years
since the publication of Everson's article. Yet, much remains the
same-indeed, as it has remained since the beginnings of our system
ofjustice. This is particularly true with regard to current conceptions
of "the appearance ofjustice, ''7 as illustrated during the discussions at
the Annenberg Washington Program/Woodrow Wilson School
Conference.
Judge Cordell's opening remarks at "The Appearance ofJustice"
Conference8 express current conceptions and concerns:
My view from the bench is that the public has a right to know, and must
always have access to proceedings in the courtroom.... It is the check
on judicial malfeasance... to make sure that the system behaves as best
it can by having public accountability.9 ... [But] when we talk about the
[current] social norms and the appearance ofjustice, we have got young
[black] men-and Latino males-coming into a system that doesn't ap-
pear fair to them.... There's got to be different approaches taken.10
This Article explores the need for future empirical research on
"the appearance of justice." In Part II, this Article gives future re-
search a start by examining what the courts, judges, trial lawyers, and
social scientists consider to be "the appearance ofjustice"; that is, what
these diverse groups imply from history, legal precedent, and empiri-
cal research about the concept of the appearance of justice, particu-
larly as it applies in criminal jury trials. The appearance of justice is
then revisited in light of recent Supreme Court decisions that may
impact, in yet unforeseen and far-reaching ways, this core concept in
American society and jurisprudence.'"
structure, statutes, and other 'legal' factors." James L. Gibson, Environmental Constraints on
the Behavior ofJudges: A Representational Model ofJudicial Decision Making 14 Law & Soc. REv.
343, 344 (1980).
6 Everson, supra note 1, at 99.
7 See The Appearance of Justice: Juries, Judges and the Media (Nov. 11, 1994) (Transcript
Proceedings), co-sponsored by the Annenberg Washington Program and the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, NJ (hereinafter
Conference Proceedings).
8 The Center of Domestic and Comparative Policy Studies of the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, in conjunction with the Annenberg Washington
Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, held this confer-
ence on November 11, 1995, at Princeton University. The Conference sought to foster an
exchange of views on the "appearance ofjustice" from the perspective of attorneys,judges,
jurors, academics, trial consultants, and the media.
9 Conference Proceedings, supra note 7, at 29-30.
10 Id. at 40-41.
11 Professors Redish and Marshall have described the appearance of justice as a core
legal concept. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
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In Part III of this Article, the need for future research is reexam-
ined in light of emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence on judicial
disqualification and recusal. Particular emphasis is placed on Liteky v.
United States. Although explanation into the cases illuminates the rela-
tionship between conceptions of the appearance of justice and stan-
dards for judicial disqualification and recusal, the relationship cannot
be fully understood without the help of future studies. Finally, the
Article summarizes the questions posed throughout the text and sug-
gests directions for future research.
II. "THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE" REVISITED
A. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ROOTS
Historically, the concept of the appearance of justice has been
closely linked with the workings of our judicial system. 12 The possibil-
ity of undesirable "appearances" and behavior by trial judges was rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court early in our history.13 Twenty years
before Everson's article, the Supreme Court, in Starr v. United States,
commented that the manner in which a judge instructs and advises
the jury can by itself have an undesirable, although sometimes permis-
sible, influence on jury decision-making processes.1 4 In Star, the
Court cautioned thatjurors must remain the triers of fact and that the
appearance of the judge's behavior must always remain "guarded" so
as to leave the jury free to exercise its own judgment.15
During the last quarter centuryjudicial decisions have reinforced
the public's common law right to know,16 which has, in turn, been
tied to the common law notion that 'justice must satisfy the appear-
ance ofjustice.' I7 As recently as 1980, the Supreme Court expanded
its conception of the appearance of justice to include not only the
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475-81 (1986).
12 For a review of this relationship, see Peter D. Blanck, Note, The Appearance ofJustice:
Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REv. 89, 97-101
(1985) (hereinafter Judges' Behavior).
13 See, e.g., Carver v. Jackson, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1, 4 (1830).
14 Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894).
15 Id. at 625; see also Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 799-800 (2d Cir. 1933) (Judge
Learned Hand stated: "Ajudge... is more than a moderator .... Justice does not depend
upon legal dialectics so much as upon the atmosphere of the courtroom, and that in the
end depends primarily upon the judge.").
16 For an outline of reasons for such actions, see Norman Davis, Comment, Nonparty
Access to Dispositions in Florida, 39 U. MusAM L. REv. 157, 168-72 (1984).
17 Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoting Offut v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). See also Etzel v. Rosenbloom, 189 P.2d 848, 852 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1948) ("Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider
soberly, and to decide impartially." (quoting Socrates)). Judge Cordell suggested this con-
nection during the Conference. See Conference Proceedings, supra note 7, at 29-80.
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possibility of judicial influence, but also the general public's right to
have meaningful access to the workings of the judicial system. In Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia, the Court held that the closing of a crimi-
nal trial to the public violated the Constitution.' 8 The Court reasoned
that:
[T] he administration ofjustice cannot function in the dark; no commu-
nity catharsis can occur ifjustice is "done in a comer [or] in any covert
manner." ... W] here the trial has been concealed from public view an
unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has
failed and at worst has been corrupted.... [T] he appearance ofjustice
can best be provided by allowing the people to observe it.' 9
The Court declared public access to the courtroom essential to the
appearance ofjustice and critical to maintaining public confidence in
the judiciary.2
0
Courts have also recognized that in a criminal jury trial due pro-
cess requires the absence of actual judicial bias toward the defend-
ant.21 Professors Redish and Marshall have suggested that the
appearance or "perception" of fairness in the courtroom is perhaps
the most important or "core" value of procedural due process.2 2 Red-
ish and Marshall write that "[f] ew perceptions more severely threaten
trust in the democratic process than the perception that a litigant
never had a chance because of the special favors that the decider
owed the other side."23
Due process not only requires, therefore, that trial judges be fair
and impartial, but it also demands that they "satisfy the appearance of
18 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
19 Id. at 571-72 (quoting the 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey,
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 37 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959)).
20 See id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice
and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for the law. Public access is essential,
therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public confidence
in the administration of justice."). The Court relied in part on the writings of Jeremy
Bentham, who emphasized the crucial role of disclosure in democratic societies. Id. at 569
(quoting 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OFJUDiCLAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827) "[I]n compari-
son of publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other
institutions might present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to oper-
ate rather as cloaks than checks.... ."). Cf. In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776
(3d Cir. 1992) ("The public's confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably
harmed if a case is allowed to proceed before a judge who appears tainted," requires that
"justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice."). See also Conference Proceedings, supra note 7,
at 36 (Dr. Sandys noting that the appearance ofjustice can be achieved best by providing
access to the system).
21 See Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 89-93.
22 Redish & Marshall, supra note 11, at 475-81.
23 Id. at 483; see also In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.").
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justice."24 Simply put, a trial judge's appearance, conduct, and behav-
ior in a criminal jury trial must never indicate to the jury that the
judge believes the accused to be guilty.25 The appearance of bias
alone has served as grounds for reversal or judicial recusal, even when
the judge is shown to be completely impartial. 26 Courts have found
due process violations sufficient to reverse criminal convictions when
a trial judge's behavior created merely the appearance of partiality.
27
Litigants have the right to argue their case fairly before the decision-
maker, and thereby, as Justice Frankfurter stated, "generat[e] the feel-
ing, so important to a popular govermment, that justice has been
done."28
Judges themselves recognize the central effect of their behavior
on the appearance ofjustice and actual fairness in the trial process. 29
"The responsibility for an atmosphere of impartiality during the
course of a trial rests upon the trial judge," noted one judge.30 And,
because of the central impact of the judge's behavior in a jury trial,
jurors "can be easily influenced by the slightest suggestion from the
court, whether it be a nod of the head, a smile, a frown, or a spoken
word."3'
In a criminal jury trial, judges, like all human beings, develop
certain beliefs about the defendant's guilt or innocence.3 2 Sometimes
these beliefs-often conveyed as "self-fulfilling prophecies "-are com-
municated by subtle, nonverbal behaviors that impermissibly influ-
ence the appearance of fairness and actual justice in the courtroom.
3 3
24 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at
136 (quoting Offutt) ("Justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice."); Walker v. Lockhart,
726 F.2d 1238, 1249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2168, cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 17
(1984); id. at 1251 (Arnold, J., concurring) ("If due process means anything, it means a
trial before an unbiased judge or jury."); U.S. CONST. amends. V. VI, XIV; United States v.
Robinson, 635 F.2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 992 (1981).
25 For a review, see Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 89-92. See also infra notes
137-40 (discussing the Lileberg case).
26 See infra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
27 For a review of cases, see Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 92-101.
28 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
29 See Peter D. Blanck, The Measure of the Judge: An Empirically-Based Framewor* for Explor-
ing TrialJudges'Behavio, 75 IowA L. REv. 653, 675-76 (1990) (hereinafter The Measure of the
Judge).
50 Bruenig v. American Family Ins., 173 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Wis. 1970) (Hallows, CJ.).
31 State v. Wheat, 292 P. 793, 797 (Kan. 1930) (Jochems, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of proposed remedies for prejudicialjudicial conduct, see Rochelle Shoretz, Letting the
Record Show: Modifying Appellate Review Procedures for Claims on Nonverbal Gestures by Trial
Court Judges, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1273, 1290-1300 (1995).
52 See Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 89, 106 (finding that judges may reveal
beliefs during a trial by directing the trial based on expectations for trial outcome).
33 See id. at 92-101.
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Several Conference participants-trial judges and attorneys-de-
scribed this phenomenon and the importance of the judge's nonver-
bal behavior alone to the appearance of justice and fairness in the
courtroom:
Judge Cordell: We judges do all kinds of things when we are presiding
over trials that are not really good, and that could lead toward this ten-
dency of depriving individuals of fair trials because of our body language
and what we are communicating to jurors .
4
Judge Carchman: [NewJersey has] a program of videotaping judges....
The judges do find out that we do roll our eyes, and shrug our shoul-
ders, and imperceptibly nod our heads no or yes, and jurors pick that
up. 
5
A NewJersey public defender: In terms of nonverbal communication of
judges, I agree that the judges do it .... A judge who was the former
prosecutor [was] fully aware of every time he rolls his eyes, turns his
back, nods his head, and he plays it right to the jury. And that occurs,
and it's almost impossible to put on the record, it's impossible to stop a
judge during the course of ajury charge and say, 'Judge, I would like to
note for the record you are nodding your head or shaking your head in
disbelief and commenting upon the defense. 3 6
These anecdotal stories and other formal acknowledgments in
state and federal court cases highlight the central importance of a
trial judge's behavior. Courts and commentators caution repeatedly
that juries accord great weight and deference to even the most subtle
behaviors of the judge.3 7 Appellate courts recognize that the imper-
missible appearance of judicial bias or unfairness at trial often
manifests itself through judges' subtle nonverbal behavior.38 A com-
mon example is the judge who demonstrates an appearance of partial-
ity by rolling his eyes in apparent disbelief during the testimony of a
witness. Appellate courts regularly are called upon to review the pro-
priety of the appearance ofjustice on jury decision-making in criminal
34 Conference roceedings, supra note 7, at 48.
35 Id. at 56.
36 Id. at 72-73.
37 See Blanck,Judges'Behavior, supra note 12, at 90; RiCHARDJ. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJEC.
TIVISM AND RELATIvISM 129 (1983) (arguing that human beings can never be devoid of
prejudices) (citing HANs-GEORC GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (David E.
Linge trans., 1966)).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979) (pointing to the trial
judge's "brilliant redirect examination that would have been entirely proper had it been
done by the prosecution"); State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Mo. 1971) (reversing
conviction for judge's reaction to defendant's alibi witness by holding and shaking head
and swiveling 180 degrees in his chair); People v. Mays, 544 N.E.2d 1264, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (reversing conviction due to judge's slamming pencil down, sighing, and making
facial gestures during cross-examination of witness by defense counsel); State v. Jenkins,
445 S.E.2d 622, 624 (N.C. 1994) (finding thatjury could reasonably infer rejection of cred-
ibility by trial judge's action in turning his back on witness).
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trials and to balance whether the alleged error in the proceeding is
"harmless"; that is, does not materially affect the trial outcome.39 Fac-
tors balanced in making a decision 4o include the relevance and nature
of the alleged behavior, the efficiency of any instruction used to cure
the error, and the prejudicial effect of the behavior in light of the
entire atmosphere of the trial.41 The Supreme Court has held that
some constitutional rights are "so basic to a fair trial that their infrac-
tion can never be treated as harmless."42 The right to an impartial
adjudicator is such a fundamental right.43
In Arizona v. Fulminate, the Court concluded that a criminal trial
tainted by a biased judge represents an example of "structural" error,
as opposed to a "trial" error.44 Trial errors occur "during the presen-
tation of the case to the jury, and... may therefore be quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to deter-
mine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."45 Structural error, on the other hand, affects the "entire con-
duct of the trial from beginning to end,"46 and encompasses ajudge's
behavior throughout the trial.
Implicit in the structural versus trial error distinction is the recog-
nition that a judge's behavior, whether explicit or subtle, can so per-
meate the atmosphere of a trial as to rise above the level of harmless
error. One court concluded that "[w] e have little doubt that facial
expressions, gestures, and nonverbal communications which tended
to ridicule defendant and counsel could, standing alone, operate so as
to destroy the fairness of a trial."47
In sum, courts recognize that the appearance of justice, as re-
89 See FED. R. Crumt. P. 52(a) (defining harmless error as "[a]ny error, defect, irregular-
ity or variance which does not affect substantial rights"). That rule also defines "plain
error" as one "affecting substantial rights [that] may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court." Id..
40 See United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that
"[the reviewing court should be more concerned with a comment on a matter central to
the defense than with comment on a tangential issue"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985);
United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371, 374-75 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting thatjudge's comment
on defendant's credibility was one factor in appellate court's reversal of conviction).
41 01gin, 745 F.2d at 268-69; Blanck, Judges'Behavior, supra note 12, at 95-96 (reviewing
appellate courts' factor approach in assessing propriety ofjudge's behavior). But case-by-
case, ad hoc determinations of the appearance ofjustice and trial error remain the norm
today. See Peter David Blanck, Calibrating the Scales of Justice: Studying Judges' Behavior in
Bench Trials, 68 IND. LJ. 1119, 1123 (1993) [Hereinafter Calibrating the Scales].
42 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
43 Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987).
44 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).
45 Id.
46 1d.
47 Allen v. State, 276 So. 2d 583, 586 (1973).
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flected in judges' behavior alone, may have important effects on trial
processes and outcomes. 48 Trial and appellate courts acknowledge
that juries, witnesses, and other trial participants accord great weight
and deference to even the most subtle behaviors of the judge.49 Yet,
limited empirical information is available to address the extent of
judges' sensitivity to and knowledge of the effects of their extralegal
behavior on fact finding, recusal, trial outcomes, or sentencing pat-
terns.50 This information gap is troubling, given that many observers
believe that the continued success of our judicial system depends fun-
damentally on the faith and confidence of the public, which depends
in turn on the appearance and reality of impartial judges.5' As dis-
cussed next, the few existing empirical studies suggest important op-
portunities for further understanding the relation among the
appearance of justice, courtroom behavior, and trial outcomes.52
B. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE
Despite historical patterns and legal precedent, participants in
our system ofjustice have rarely relied on empirical methods for eval-
uating judicial behavior and its impact on trial fairness, judicial
recusal or disqualification, or the appearance of justice.53 Indeed,
48 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (providing classic
study of judges and juries); JOHN P. RYAN ET AL, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK
STYLES AND PERFORMANCE (1980) (encompassing comprehensive analysis ofjudges' behav-
ior); Blanck, The Measure of theJudgA supra note 29, at 654 & n.12 (discussing sources recog-
nizing importance ofjudge's behavior).
49 AsJudgeJochems remarked in 1930, "[t]he trial judge occupies a high position. He
presides over the trial. The jury has great respect for him. They can be easily influenced
by the slightest suggestion coming from the court, whether it be a nod of the head, a smile,
a frown, or a spoken word." State v. Wheat, 292 P. 793, 797 (Kan. 1930) (Jochems, J.,
dissenting), quoted in State v. Hamilton, 731 P.2d 863, 868 (Kan. 1987); Marino v.
Cocuzza, 81 A.2d 181, 185 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951); see also Blanck, Judge's Behavior,
supra note 12, at 155-56 (pattern jury instruction warning that behavior of judge during
trial should not influence jury decision-making).
50 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 1201, 1203 (1992) (questioning
whetherjudges or jurors "know bias when they see it"); see also LaDoris H. Cordell & Flo-
rence 0. Keller, Pay No Attention to the Woman Behind the Bench: Musings of a Trial Court
Judge, 68 IND. LJ. 1199 (1993) (arguing thatjurors attribute certain opinions, feelings, and
biases to judicial personnel through transference).
5' See, e.g., Redish & Marshall, supra note 11, at 483-84.
52 See, e.g., Everson, supra note 1, at 99 (early study of magistrates behavior); cf. CATHE-
RINE FrI-zMAURICE & KEN PEASE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUDICIAL SENTENCING 7 (1986) (provid-
ing a comparative study of sentencing and noting alleged remark by Lord ChiefJustice that
research on judicial behavior "would not tell judges anything they did not already know
53 See Charles-Edward Anderson, Trial by Press?: Pretrial Publicity Doesn't BiasJurors, Panel-
ists Say, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 32 (reporting consensus of panelists at The Annenberg
Washington Program that jurors subject to extensive publicity can put aside preconcep-
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practitioners often confuse conceptions of trial fairness and judicial
impartiality.54 Professor Leubsdorf writes: "Educated by the Legal
Realists and their successors, lawyers fear that the values and exper-
iences of judges ultimately shape their decisions. Yet lawyers also be-
lieve that it must mean something to speak of ajudge as impartial, and
we also suspect that the role of law depends on the belief that the rule
of law is more than a masquerade." 55
As late as 1985, the factors influencing the appearance of justice
had not been tested through systematic empirical study of actual tri-
als. In light of federal and state case law, as well as concerns by judges
themselves, the absence of systematic information was and continues
to be striking.56 Since 1985, few empirical studies in law and law-re-
lated publications have examined conceptions of the appearance of
justice.57 The majority of relevant studies have focused primarily on
litigants' (or mock litigants') perceptions of procedural and distribu-
tive fairness and their relation to trial outcomes.58
In one study of federal court jurisdiction, the appearance ofjus-
tice, as reflected by a fear of local court bias, was found to be the
primary motivating force behind attorneys' forum choice.59 In find-
ing that a majority of plaintiff and defense attorneys reported that
local (e.g., judicial) bias rather than other tactical considerations de-
dions if judges provide proper instructions and other curative assistance); John B. Mc-
Conahay et al., The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Political and Racial Overtones: The Trial
ofJoan Little 41 LAw & Corrn,. PRoas. 205, 213-20 (1977) (recounting juror selection
strategies based on empirical model, personality traits, and juror nonverbal behavior).
54 See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L REv.
237, 245 (1987) (suggesting that in this confusion lies a repressed crisis of confidence in
the idea ofjudicial impartiality).
55 Id. at 245 (emphasis in original). Leubsdorf also concludes that the appearance of
justice standard "can best be understood as an unsatisfactory attempt to mediate between
introspection and objectivity." Id. at 27,7.
56 See CharlesJ. Ogietree,Jr., Arizona v. Fulminate: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to
Coerced Confessions, 105 HIARv. L. REv. 152, 163 (1991) (noting the lack of systematic study
of harmless error rule); Gary B. Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing (Psychology Is Too), 16 LAw
& Hum. BEHAV. 381, 387-88 (1992) (suggesting some positive effects of psychological in-
quiry in the legal system).
57 A search located more than 800 law review articles, notes and comments, published
since 1985 in which "the appearance of justice" was discussed, however, none involved
empirical study of the concept.
58 For discussion of research impact of variations of procedure on the appearance of
justice and perceived fairness, see Laurens Walker, E. Allan Lind, &John Thibault, The
Relation Between Procedural and DistributiveJustice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401 (1979). See also Daniel
Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance ofJustice 10 HtARv. L. REv. 530, 531
(not grounding verdicts on statistical probability evidence in civil cases "may reflect the
self-serving interest of lawyers in promoting the mere appearance ofjustice under the legal
system, rather than sound public policy").
59 Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 Am. U.L REv. 369 (1992).
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termined forum choice, Professor Miller characterized such percep-
tions, whether or not congruent with reality, "as a reality in its own
right, requiring action to preserve the appearance ofjustice."6
0
In another study, Professors Lind and Lissak experimentally
manipulated the appearance of justice in a mock trial procedure by
introducing an obvious trial impropriety.61  These researchers
presented participants (mock jurors) with evidence of a personal rela-
tionship between the trial judge and the plaintifffs lawyer.6 2 The par-
ticipants were then informed of the outcome of the case and asked to
evaluate the fairness of the trial results. The findings indicated a
strong relationship between the appearance of the impropriety and
the trial outcome. The presence of the impropriety, combined with
an unfavorable outcome, substantially decreased the mock jurors' per-
ceptions of trial fairness.
63
Since 1985, my colleagues and I have conducted a series of empir-
ical studies on the appearance of justice in jury and bench trials.
64
The appearance of justice and judges' courtroom behavior were ex-
amined in lower state courts, where an estimated ninety to ninety-five
percent of all cases are handled.
65
Our studies examined the impact of evidentiary and extralegal
factors, both in isolation and in combination, on decision-making by
juries and judges. We developed a research model to provide an em-
pirical framework for a more comprehensive view of the appearance
ofjustice. 66 The model set forth a method for researchers, practition-
60 Id. at 426.
61 E. Allan Lind and Robin Lissak, Apparent Impropriety and Procedural Fairness Judgments,
21 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 19 (1982).
62 Cf infra notes 174-88 and accompanying text (discussing actual cases involving "ex-
trajudicial bias" and the appearance ofjustice).
63 Lind & Lissak, supra note 61, at 21. Also, a favorable outcome for the defendant
increased the perceived procedural fairness of the trial significantly more when the impro-
priety was present. Id..
64 See generally Blanck, Calibrating the Scales, supra note 41, at 1119; Peter D. Blanck,
What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges' and Juries' Behavior, 40 AM.U. L. REv. 775,
776 (1991) [hereinafter Empirical Research]; Blanck, The Measure of the Judge, supra note 29,
at 655-57 (describing research that studied judges' behavior to determine if it "appears" to
trial participants to be fair and impartial); Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 89-97
(discussing judicial influence and its relationship to procedural due process).
65 John Hagan & Kristin Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of
Sentencing Research, in RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM II (Alfred Blum-
stein et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter RESEARCH ON SENTENCING]. See also MALCOLM M. FEE-
LEY, THE PROCESS Is THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN LOWER CRIMINAL COURT XV
(1979).
66 Initial studies investigated the various legal and extralegal influences on trial deci-
sion-making processes. For instance, in studies conducted in the California courts, we ex-
amined the role of judges' verbal and nonverbal behavior in predicting the outcome of
criminal jury trials. The relation among legal factors (e.g., criminal history of the defend-
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ers, and courts to assess factors that may influence, sometimes imper-
missibly, decision-making in actual trials. The model tested the
conclusion made by others that, in close cases, extralegal behavior
alone, such as judges' nonverbal behavior, has a relatively greater im-
pact on trial outcome than does the evidence presented at trial.67
Our initial appearance of justice studies explored the effects of
judges' behavior on jury verdicts and on other trial process variables. 68
We concluded that a systematic understanding of judges' behavior
and its potential influence on trial decision-making, recusal, and sen-
tencing patterns will require further examination.69
Several core findings emerged, however, from our empirical stud-
ies. For instance, four "global styles" ofjudicial behavior were deline-
ated: 'judicial," "directive," "confident," and "wann." 70 In addition,
more "micro" appearance behaviors ofjudges were identified and ex-
amined, including the amount of eye contact with trial participants,
and the frequency of smiles, hand movements, or head nods. 71
The studies also identified various relationships among the de-
fendants' background characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and prior
criminal history), the judges' expectations for trial outcome, the ap-
pearance ofjustice as reflected in the judges' global and micro behav-
ant) and extralegal factors (e.g., preconceived biases and judges' behavior reflecting the
appearance ofjustice) were explored through empirical testing of a model of courtroom
dynamics.
67 SeeJ. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of a
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REv. 741 (1988) (responding to criticism that
availability of prior psychological research on trial processes enhances lawyers' abilities to
influence jurors).
68 See Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 101-37 (proposing preliminary model
and describing the characteristics); see also Robert Rosenthal, Pavlov's Mice, Pfungst's Horse
and Pygnalion's PONS: Some Models for the Study of Interpersonal Expectancy Effects, in THE
CLEVER HANS PHENOMENON 185-89 (Thomas A. Seboek & Robert Rosenthal eds., 1981)
(discussing general model for interpersonal effects).
69 Earlier studies of courtroom behavior primarily explored bivariate relationships,
such as the relation of race and sentencing. See Blanck, Judges'Behavior, supra note 12, at
104-05.
70 The judges' behavior was rated by independent observers of the videotapes. See
Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 117-18; Blanck, The Measure of aJudge supra note
29, at 657-62 (stating that the principal components statistical methodology used to analyze
judges' behavior is a useful and practical way to reduce number of variables to describe
behavior); see alsoJAmEs EsEsmrSErN & HERBERTJACOB, FELONYJUsriCE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSis OF CiuMNAL COURTS 24-28 (1977) (proposing four trial goals that reflectjudges'
behavior-reducing conflict, avoiding uncertainty, processing cases, doingjustice-that re-
late to the four global styles, respectively: warm, confident, directive, and judicial).
71 See Blanck, Calibrating the Scales, supra note 41, at 1183-91 (describing codes for micro
behaviors). A predictive relationship between global styles and micro behaviors high-
lighted the potential methodological contribution of the model to a study of trial out-
comes. Id. at 1134-35.
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iors, and trial outcome.72 The empirical model proved most powerful
and predictive when examining combinations of these variables. 73
Three central themes emerged from our initial studies conducted
in the California courts.74 First, and most predictably, judges tended
to expect a guilty verdict when the criminal histories of defendants
were relatively more serious. Thus, although criminal history should
have no legal bearing on a determination of guilt or innocence, it
appears to influence judges' expectations for trial outcomes in pre-
dictable ways. In fact, defendants with more serious criminal histories
were more likely to be found guilty.
Second, judges' knowledge of defendants' criminal histories, in-
formation that a jury ordinarily is not allowed to learn unless a de-
fendant testifies, predicted aspects of judges' behavior when
instructing their juries. Judges, consciously or unconsciously, may
sometimes "leak" or reveal to juries their underlying beliefs about de-
fendants through nonverbal channels. The appearance ofjudges' be-
havior alone may convey messages to jurors, sometimes impermissibly,
concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence.
Third, although the findings showed that judges' expectations
alone did not predict trial outcomes, there was a trend for the appear-
ance of justice to be related to trial outcomes. Judges' global styles
appeared to be less judicial and directive when the jury reached a
guilty verdict.75 Perhaps the most compelling conclusion to be drawn
from the California study is that the appearance ofjustice as reflected
in judges' behavior alone could predict the verdicts returned by juries,
as well as other aspects of juries' decision-making processes.
Subsequent studies in the Iowa state courts examined the concept
of the appearance of justice in criminal bench trials, employing a
modified version of the research model. 76 The Iowa studies also as-
sessed the strength and quality of the evidence presented in the case.
In addition, instead of videotaping trials, the Iowa study tested an on-
line coding scheme for assessing the appearance ofjustice and court-
72 See id. at 1136-41 (describing simple bivariate relationships generated by the model).
73 Multiple regression analysis were used to explore effects in the model. See asOJACOB
COHEN & PATRICIA COHEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS FOR
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 7 (2d ed. 1983).
74 For a summary of the findings, see Blanck, Calibrating the Scales, supra note 41, at 1137-
46.
75 Although the findings suggested that the appearance of justice alone may predict
trial outcomes, the results varied with regard to the type of communication and informa-
tion conveyed. See Blanck, Judges" Behavior, supra note 12, at 135.




The findings from the Iowa study support many of those in the
California study. For instance, the appearance of justice varied de-
pending on the verdict expected by judges (e.g., tending to show
fewer smiles when expecting guilty verdicts and the converse for not
guilty verdicts). Moreover, when the evidence presented at trial was
rated by independent observers as strong towards guilt, judges showed
less eye contact and fewer smiles, yet were rated as more judicial, di-
rective, and warm toward trial participants (e.g., arguably attempting
to appear fair).
In addition, in cases where a guilty verdict was rendered, judges
showed less eye contact and fewer smiles (i.e., appearing negative), yet
were rated as globally warmer in relating to trial participants. Consis-
tent with the findings from the California study, judges' expectations
for guilty verdicts were found to predict actual trial outcomes of guilt.
The findings from the Iowa study suggest that the strongest pre-
dictor of trial outcomes is the strength of the evidence presented. Evi-
dentiary strength is a better predictor than the independent but
smaller effect ofjudges' behavior. The appearance ofjustice during
the trial (e.g., as reflected by thejudges' behavior) is a relatively better
predictor of sentencing patterns than of trial outcomes. 78 While the
strength of the evidence may appear as the central factor in trial out-
comes, other factors may independently influence the process in sig-
nificant ways. For instance, judges' behavior may be particularly
influential in cases in which the evidence is close.79
Additional study is needed to reveal the complexity of the appear-
ance ofjustice and trial judges' behavior and to replace unsubstanti-
ated myths about courtroom behavior with empirically validated
conclusions.80 Recent criticism of our system of justice has been
77 See id. at 1192-98 (highlighting the reliability and consistency of on-line rating sys-
tem, but in the Iowa study, defendants' criminal history variable was not available); see also
BlanckJudges'Behavior, supra note 12, at 113-114 (discussing value of courtroom research).
The on-line method in the Iowa studies enabled collection of data similar to that in the
California studies.
78 The Iowa findings also suggested thatjudges appeared able to separate factors affect-
ing their fact finding role (i.e., the determination of guilt) from those affecting their sen-
tencing function. See Blanck, Calibrating the Scales, supra note 41, at 1163.
79 Close cases were defined in the Iowa studies by analyses controlling for strength of
the evidence. See id. at 1164-67.
80 See Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in Legal Psy-
chology, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 40-42 (1979) (criticizing reliance on simulated legal
research for developing practical recommendations); see also Peter D. Blanck & Arthur N.
Turner, Gestalt Research: Clinical-Field-Research Approaches to Studying Organizations, in HAND-
BOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 109, 111 (Jay W. Lorsch ed., 1987) (stating that field
research may be appropriate where goal is to improve practice).
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based increasingly on anecdotal or media-driven views of the appear-
ance of unfairness, as manifested, for example, by difficulties in com-
prehending the law, unfair procedural forces, or other factors
portrayed as inherent to our system of justice.8'
Elsewhere, Professor Saks and I have suggested the need for em-
pirical research examining the appearance ofjustice and trial fairness
in criminal and civil contexts, such as in aggregated trials or mass tort
cases.8 2 Research is needed, however, to determine how perceptions
of procedural and distributive justice affect the appearance of justice
and actual trial fairness.88
The lack of study is particularly puzzling, given thatjudicial train-
ing programs increasingly emphasize the importance of judges' be-
havior and decision-making in the courtroom.8 4  Most judges,
however, receive little feedback about their actual courtroom commu-
nication, and what little they do receive is mostly anecdotal.8 5 This
may be due in part to the absence of standardized feedback mecha-
nisms, to the reluctance of judges to receive such feedback, or to the
lack of effective techniques for monitoring the impact of their court-
room behavior.8 6
At the Conference, Judge Cordell echoed these concerns:
[0] ne thing is to do studies and to get the word out there that we judges
need education, we need to better understand what we are doing when
we preside over trials. [T] he system is so rigid and resistant to change,
and if anybody can change the system and make it better, it's judges. We
have the authority. We decide what goes on in our courtroom, and un-
fortunately, so many judges are motivated to do what they do because of
appellate review.
8 7
81 See MichaelJ. Saks, Do We Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System
and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992) (reviewing empirical evidence on behavior of
tort litigation system and demonstrating the inadequacy of evidence for drawing conclu-
sions how the system actually performs); Tanford & Tanford, supra note 67, at 742 (argu-
ing that critics of legal system exaggerate the importance of legal and extralegal factors on
trial outcomes).
82 Michael Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggre-
gation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815, 832-33 (1992).
83 Id. at 832.
84 Blanck, The Measure of theJudge, supra note 29, at 676 (discussing program that video-
tapes and analyzes judge's behavior during trial proceedings).
85 Cordell & Keller, supra note 50, at 1202-03.
86 See Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 140-41 (for reasons why judges may
receive little feedback).
87 Conference Proceedings, supra note 7, at 48. See also Robert Hanley, A Courtroom Experi-
ment in High-Tech Vueo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1992, at B8 (discussingjudge's informal study
of videotapes of courtroom proceedings to analyze his own performance and behaviors).
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III. EMERGING IssuEs
This section illustrates that while existing research has identified
the appearance ofjustice and judicial conduct as critical to trial fair-
ness, further study is needed to better understand their central role in
our system of justice. Recent court decisions involving standards for
the recusal and disqualification of state and federal judges and the
appearance of justice have left more questions than answers, thus
highlighting the need for further empirical research.
A. STATE AND FEDERAL COURT STANDARDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES
1. State Courts
Disqualification of a state court judge is required when the pre-
siding judge recognizes, or the moving party demonstrates, that the
judge either has a direct interest in the case, is closely related to one
of the parties, or is prejudiced against or biased toward one of the
parties.88 Many states provide other grounds for disqualifying ajudge
when prejudice or bias is alleged or could reasonably be inferred.
Such provisions seek to preserve the values embodied in the appear-
ance ofjustice.
State statutes provide two general types ofjudicial disqualification
for cases in which actual bias is not proved. First, some states provide
litigants an absolute right to disqualification through a peremptory
challenge to an allegedly biased judge.8 9 Second, some states grant
parties a conditional right to disqualification when ajudge's impartial-
ity in a proceeding might reasonably be questioned. 90 The provisions
are not mutually exclusive and often coexist in a jurisdiction. 9'
Nineteen states provide litigants with a statutory right to make a
peremptory challenge to remove ajudge believed to be prejudiced or
biased.92 Two forms of "peremptory challenge" provisions exist. The
88 See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26A.015 (Baldwin, 1994).
89 See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a), id. at 114-5(d); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 170.1, 170.6
(West Supp. 1992).
92 SeeALAsKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (1988); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-409 (1992); CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West Supp. 1992); HAw. REv. STAT. § 601-7(b) (1988); IDAHO R. Civ.
PRO. 40(d)(1) (1987); 725 ILCS 5/1145(a) (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-5-1 (Bums
1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20.311(d) (1988); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 542.16 (West 1988); Mo. R.
Civ. PRO. 51.05 (West 1976 & Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804 (1991); N.D. CEwr.
CODE § 29-15-21 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-9 (Michie 1992); N-v. Sup. CT. R. 48.1; OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 14-250-70 (1991); S.D. CODmED LAWS ANN. § 15-12-22 (1984); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§4.12.040-50 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.58 (West Supp.
1991); and WYo. R. CIV. PRO. 40.1(b) (1) (1992). Analysis of the peremptory challenge
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first form, used in Wisconsin, closely mirrors the peremptory chal-
lenges of jurors: a party may remove a presiding judge without ex-
pressing a reason for the request. In jurisdictions with this standard,
the judge may be removed when a party files the required written doc-
uments within the time limits of the statute.
93
California uses the second form of peremptory challenge.
94
Under the California rule, a movant retains an automatic right to dis-
qualify a judge, provided the movant makes the motion with a good
faith belief in the judge's prejudice95 and within the prescribed time
limits.96 In California, the act of verification in making the motion
under oath establishes good faith.97 A motion for disqualification
under this statute does not require allegations of specific facts sup-
porting assertions of prejudice or bias.98
To protect against potential misuse, statutes providing litigants
with peremptory challenges have imposed strict limitations on their
use. Not only are peremptory motions for disqualification subject to
provisions shows that the provisions are limited in their scope by the type of proceeding,
the standards necessary for granting the motion, the timing requirements, and the number
of challenges available. See Randy Merritt, Avoiding the "I Didn't Have a Chance" Syn-
drome: A Proposed Judicial Disqualification Statute for Iowa (1995) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author).
93 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.58 (West Supp. 1991) (requiring filing of written request
for substitution with no reason necessary). Among the states adopting this standard are:
MIN. STAT. ANN. §542.16 (West 1988) (requiring filing of notice to remove with court
administrator and service of notice on opposing party); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804 (1991)
(requiring motion filed with clerk without allegation of cause); N.D. CETrr. CODE § 29-15-
21 (1991) (requiring written demand for change of judge, including statement of good
faith).
94 See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 170.6 (West Supp. 1992). Other states adopting this stan-
dard include: ALAsKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (1988) (requiring filing of affidavit alleging belief
in inability to receive a fair and impartial trial along with statement assuring good faith and
.not for purposes of delay"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-12-21-27 (same) (1984); OR.
REv. STAT. § 14-250-70 (1991) (requiring filing of affidavit alleging belief in inability to
receive a fair and impartial trial).
95 SeeJourney v. Superior Court, San Diego County, 120 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975) (stating that good faith belief in prejudice is sufficient and that proof of facts of
actual bias is not required).
96 See Mackey v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that,
based on the provisions of 170.6, peremptory challenge must be made at least five days
before date set for beginning of trial if presidingjudge is identified ten days before date set
for trial or hearing).
97 See Solberg v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 561 P.2d 1148
(Cal. 1977). Oregon's statute requires a challenged judge either to withdraw immediately
or to request a "good faith" hearing before anotherjudge. See State ex rel Strain v. Foster,
537 P.2d 547 (Or. 1975). The challenged judge bears the burden of proving that the
movant made the motion in bad faith or for purpose of delaying the proceedings. See State
ex rel Kafoury v. Jones, 843 P.2d 932 (Or. 1992).
98 SeeJourney v. Superior Court of San Diego, 120 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1975).
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timeliness requirements, 99 but the number of permitted challenges is
restricted.'00 Furthermore, peremptory challenge provisions may not
be used to disqualify a judge solely based on group affiliation (e.g.,
race or gender grounds).101
In addition to the absolute right of disqualification granted in
peremptory challenges, litigants in a majority of jurisdictions have a
conditional right to require allegedly biased judges to disqualify or
recuse themselves. Most states require such disqualification if a per-
son "of ordinary prudence" in the judge's position and knowing all of
the facts known to the judge could find a reasonable basis for ques-
tioning thejudge's impartiality. 0 2 This standard requires disqualifica-
tion even in cases in which the allegation of bias is not supported by
substantial fact.
103
To mandate disqualification under the "appearance of impartial-
ity" test, however, requires that the alleged bias, hostility, or prejudice
be "personal." 10 4 In most states, this means that the alleged impartial-
ity must stem from an "extrajudicial source" outside of the judge's
experience obtained during the course of the particular legal pro-
ceeding.10 5 In such states, "extrajudicial source" bias must be alleged
99 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (1991) (requiring filing of challenge within ten days
of notice of assignment or notice of trial date scheduled); OR. REv. STAT. § 14-250-70
(1991) (requiring filing within ten days after assignment of case to judge); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 22.20.022 (1988) (requiring filing within five days after issue is assigned to a judge).
100 See CA. Cw. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West Supp. 1992) (limiting challenge to one
judge); OR. REv. STAT. § 14-260(5) (1991) (allowing only two applications for removal for
any proceeding).
101 See People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring
party challenging on group bias grounds to establish prima facie case of invidious discrimi-
nation and, if case is established, placing burden on challenging party to show that chal-
lenge was not predicated solely on group bias).
102 See, e.g., Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 820 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1994); Riddle v. State,
No. CR93-1117, 1994 WL 717032 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); Wilson v. Wilson, No. CD-94-
1174, 1994 WL 705352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 546 N.E.2d 354
(Mass. 1989). But see supra notes 85-86 (stating that most judges lack information and
training to make such decisions).
103 See, e.g., Ross v. Luton, 456 So.2d 249 (Ala. 1984).
104 Ex pare Duncan, 638 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1994).
105 Seee.g., State v. Farni, 325 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 1982) (requiring for recusal of
judge that alleged bias stem from an extrajudicial source); Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384
(Del. 1991) (same); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 323 (N.M.
1980) (same); People v. Butler, 484 N.E.2d 921, 933 (I1. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Smith v.
Smith, 564 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (same); Riddie v. State, No. Cr 93-1117,
1994 WL 717032 at *4 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (same); Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d. 810, 821
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (same); Shahmoradi v. Bing, No. 01-93-00439-CV, 1994 WL
362788 at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (same); McBride v. State, 446 S.E.2d. 193, 195 (Ga. CL
App. 1994) (same); In re Bell, 373 A.2d 232, 233 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977) (same); State v.
Williams, 601 So.2d 1374, 1374 (La. 1992) (same); Desfosses v. Desfosses, 813 P.2d 366, 368




for judicial disqualification to be required. 106
However, not all states require an "extrajudicial source" of the
alleged bias. According to the Colorado Supreme Court, for instance,
disqualification is required if a person could reasonably infer that a
judge has a personal bias or prejudice against one of the litigants or
his attorney.10 7 The Colorado court narrowed the test by specifying
two additional questions. 108 First, the court must determine whether
the motion and supporting affidavits allege facts sufficient to reason-
ably infer that the judge is either prejudiced or biased against a litigat-
ing party, in fact or appearance. The second inquiry consists of
determining whether, and to what extent, the judge manifests an atti-
tude of hostility or ill will toward an attorney, such that the judge's
impartiality reasonably may be questioned. 10 9 Unlike the extrajudicial
source requirement test, the alleged bias test against either a party or
counsel need not arise outside of the legal proceeding." 0 In Colo-
rado, for example, disqualification will not be required unless "the
parties or the public are left with a substantial doubt as to the ability of
the judge to fairly and impartially resolve pending litigation.""'
Other state courts, such as those in Florida, have required judicial
disqualification when the alleged or actual bias by the trial judge is
"pervasive." 112 As discussed above, systematically determining the
106 See infra notes 174-88 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving extrajudicial
source bias).
107 See S.S. v. Wakefield, 764 P.2d 70, 72 (Colo. 1988) (requiring motion to disqualify
and supporting affidavits to allege facts sufficient to make a reasonable inference that the
judge held a personal bias against either moving party or her attorney).
108 Each question may be tested through empirical assessment. See infra notes 235-50
and accompanying text (discussing questions for future empirical study).
109 Wakefield, 764 P.2d at 73. The difficulties associated with the systematic assessment of
such alleged bias were described in Part I above.
110 See Klinck v. District Court, 876 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (disqualify-
ing a judge from presiding over pending criminal case based on bias inferred from com-
ments made by the judge at the conclusion of a bond hearing). In Klinck, bias was inferred
reasonably when the judge allegedly said to the defendant's co-counsel that "if you do not
keep [Klinck's other co-counsel] on a short leash, you will have problems in this case." Id.
at 1273, 1277. The court concluded that this judicial statement indicated an "absence of
the impartiality necessary to assure that Klinck [would) receive a fair trial." Id. at 1277.
1ll Goebel v. Benton, 830 P.2d 995, 999 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). This "substantial
doubt" standard is similar to that used in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., In re McFall, 617 A.2d
707, 713 (Pa. 1992) (requiring recusal when substantial doubt exists as to the ability of the
judge to impartially preside over the proceeding).
112 An example of pervasive bias arises when a judge "actively refutes," verbally or
nonverbally, factual allegations brought by a party seeking to disqualify thejudge. Injuris-
dictions permitting the judge to rule on the legal sufficiency of the motion, an attempt by
the judge to pass on the factual matters alleged may create a pervasive bias sufficient to
require disqualification. See Rogers v. State, 630 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1993) (requiring
evidentiary hearing before different judge when original judge participated in a "mini-
hearing" to determine veracity of defendant's allegations concerning the judge, as the be-
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extent to which behavior is pervasive is an empirical question.'13
Under the Florida approach, disqualification is possible whether the
"pervasive bias" derives from an "extra" or "intrajudicial" source."14
2. Federal Courts
Sections 144 and 455 of the Judicial Code address the disqualifi-
cation of federal judges."a 5 Section 144 provides the framework for
motions to disqualify ajudge on grounds of personal bias or prejudice
to the litigants."16 Section 455 provides the criteria for mandatory
self-disqualification ofjudges."1
7
Section 144 requires the assignment of an alternate judge to hear
the legal proceeding if a sufficiently supported claim ofjudicial preju-
dice or bias is timely filed. 118 The 1921 Supreme Court decision in
Berger v. United States" 9 sets forth an early test for disqualification of a
federal judge under section 21 of the United StatesJudicial Code, the
controlling section prior to section 144.120 In Berger, the German de-
fendant filed an affidavit claiming that a fair trial was not possible
before a judge who allegedly made public anti-German remarks
outside of a criminal espionage trial.121 The Court held that the
havior generated an appearance of bias that "was so pervasive it tainted the remainder of
the proceeding.").
113 See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
114 See Rogers, 630 So. 2d at 515-16 (failing to take into account the possible source of
bias).
115 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1994).
116 Section 144 states:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a per-
sonal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or preju-
dice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at
which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it
within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
117 Section 455 states:
(a) Anyjustice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding....
118 28 U.S.C. § 144.
119 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
120 See id. at 35. The Berger interpretation of § 21 has been held authoritative by federal
courts interpreting § 144. See, e.g., United States v. Hofia, 382 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir.
1967), cert. denea 390 U.S. 924 (1968) (citing Berger as authority for interpreting § 144).
121 The alleged statement was quoted in Berger "One must have a very judicial mind,
indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German[-]Americans in this country. Their
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judge should have been disqualified from the proceedings. 122
Under the Berger test, a judge may be disqualified if. (1) a party
files an affidavit 128 claiming personal bias or prejudice demonstrating
an "objectionable inclination or disposition of the judge";124 and (2)
the claim of bias is based on facts antedating the trial.125 The second
part of the Berger test is analogous to the state court extrajudicial
source doctrine described earlier.
126
Section 455 of the Judicial Code defines the standards for self-
disqualification or recusal. The 1970 version of section 455 of the
Code required a judge to disqualify himself if the questionable cir-
cumstances "render[ed] it improper, in his qpinion, for him to sit."12
7
Since 1970, this section of the Code has undergone modification. To
increase public confidence in the judiciary through adherence to a
more "objective" standard for determining impartiality, 28 Congress in
1974 amended section 455 to conform with the American Bar Associa-
tion's (ABA) Code ofJudicial Conduct. In Canon 3C, the ABA Code
hearts are reeking with disloyalty." 255 U.S. at 28.
122 Id. at 36. The challenged judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, achieved lasting notori-
ety as the first commissioner of major league baseball in the aftermath of the infamous
Black Sox scandal of 1919. SeeJOHN HEYLAR, LoRDs OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISrORY OF
BASEBALT 7-8 (1994) (relating the background behind the choice of Judge Landis to be
baseball's first commissioner).
123 Beger, 255 U.S. at 33. The affadavit must be accompanied by a certification of coun-
sel. Id..
124 Berger, 255 U.S. at 35. The challenged judge cannot pass on the truth of the matters
alleged. The judge may only rule on their legal sufficiency. Id. at 36.
125 Berger, 255 U.S. at 34. In United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), the
Court recites the extrajudicial source doctrine and applies it to § 144. Id. at 583. The
reason behind this requirement is explicitly stated in United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856,
859 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 924 (1968). Bias and prejudice occurring during
a trial can be addressed, and if necessary corrected, through the appeal process. Id.
126 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Two additional facets of the test for dis-
qualification under § 144 were not addressed in Berger. First, the statute requires the timely
filing of the affidavit to be a minimum of ten days before the trial begins, absent a showing
of good cause for the failure to file. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994). This requirement is cited
in Hoffa, 382 F.2d at 859 and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v.
Bangor & Aroostook K-R. Co., 380 F.2d 570, 576 & n.13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
327, 328 (1967). Second, courts have required that the affidavit make specific allegations
of facts that raise the belief in the judge's bias or prejudice; allegations based on inference
or generalities are insufficient. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 380 F.2d at 576; see Hoffa,
382 F.2d at 860.
127 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994) (emphasis added).
128 The legislative history in the House Report noted that amended subsection (a) con-
tains a general provision "that a judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might be reasonably questioned. This sets up an objective standard, rather
than the subjective standard... of the phrase 'in his opinion.'" This standard "is designed
to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary]; if there is a reasonable
factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let
anotherjudge preside." H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.CAN. 6351, 6354-55.
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set forth an objective standard for determining judicial disqualifica-
tion. 29 Canon 3C requires that a judge disqualify himself when the
judge's impartiality "might be reasonably questioned."'3 0 A judge
should be disqualified if a "reasonable man knowing all the circum-
stances" would still hold doubts about the judge's impartiality.1 3 1
Again, this test is in need of empirical study.
Thus amended, the 1975 Judicial Code requires not only that a
biased judge not participate, but also that no person could reasonably
believe such bias to be present. The 1975 Code intended to foster the
appearance of impartiality throughout the judiciary 3 2 and recognized
the necessity of the appearance ofjustice for the maintaining of pub-
lic confidence in the judiciary. 33 Court authority rests upon confi-
dence in the judiciary, which in turn depends upon belief in reasoned
judicial decisions, uninfluenced by personal interests, biases, or con-
siderations of the judge.Im The Code replaced as a guiding principle
in disqualification decisions the "duty to sit" concept predominating
in the federal courts with the "appearance of justice" notion, 3 5 pro-
viding for judicial disqualification where the judge's impartiality
"might reasonably be questioned."' 3
6
As. recently as 1988, the Supreme Court affirmed the amended
1975 Code in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,137 where it
valued the appearance of justice so highly that a trial judge was re-
quired to disqualify himself retroactively, even though he was unaware
129 CODE OFJUDICLAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (Am. Bar Ass'n 1972), reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 6351, 6353-54.
130 Id. See generally supra part I.
13 H.R. REP. No. 1453 at 60.
132 See Note, Disqualification ofJudges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARv. L. REV.
736, 745-46 (1973) ("standard of a reasonable man knowing all the facts does not reduce
[the] emphasis on appearance; ... and hidden facts tending to rebut an inference of
partiality are presumably in the judge's power to reveal once public suspicion of his partial-
ity in a given instance has been aroused.").
133 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. As mentioned in part I, supra, this
public perception concern lies at the heart of what is unique to the nature of the judicial
process in a democratic society. Courts in such a society, as Justice Frankfurter observed,
possess "neither the purse nor the sword." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
134 See Note, supra note 132, at 747 (listing specific difficulties in implementing a stricter
appearance test, including increased disqualifications which might "undermine public
confidence in the judiciary," and greater inconvenience in providing competentjudges to
hear particular cases).
135 See United States v. International Business Machines Corp. (In re International Busi-
ness Machines Corp.), 618 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1980) (ruling that courts in determining
disqualification under § 455 must look to see whether a reasonable person would believe
that the judge's impartiality could be questioned).
136 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994).
137 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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of a potential conflict of interest when the case was decided.' 38 In
Liljeberg, the Court held that public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary does not require a judge's scienter for disqualification. 3 9 A
judge's lack of knowledge fails to "eliminate the risk that 'his imparti-
ality might be reasonably questioned' by other persons," thereby hin-
dering public confidence in the judiciary.' 40
After the Court's adoption of the Liljeberg "objective test" for dis-
qualification, lower federal courts began to merge the requirements
of section 455 with the "extrajudicial source doctrine."' 4' The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied
the extrajudicial source limitation to section 455 (a) in United States v.
Barry.142 In Barry, the District of Columbia Mayor sought both disqual-
ification of the presiding judge and re-sentencing for his conviction of
cocaine possession. 43 Four days before sentencing, speaking at an
independent function, the judge remarked on the truthfulness of pro-
spectivejurors at the mayor's trial.' 44 On this basis, Barry claimed that
the judge should have disqualified himself before sentencing. 45 The
court of appeals concluded that a reasonable person would not ques-
tion the judge's impartiality based on his out-of-court remarks
alone. 46 Barry illustrates that appellate courts will apply to section
455 motions the objective reasonable person standard for bias derived
from an extrajudicial source.
The federal courts of appeals have been split, however, be-
tween 147 and among"4 themselves regarding whether section 455(a)
138 Id. at 859, 868-70.
139 Id. at 859.
140 Id.; cf Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 849, 358 (1977) (plurality) (stating that a death
penalty decision must "be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emo-
tion"). See also Blanck, Calibrating the Scales, supra note 41, at 1176-77.
141 For a review of the case law on this issue, see generally Christopher R. Carton, Com-
ment, Disqualifying Federal Judges for Bias: A Consideration of the Extrajudicial Bias Limitation
for Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 2057 (1994). This doc-
trine is not limited to federal courts, but is included in many state jurisdiction tests. See
supra note 105 and accompanying text.
142 961 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
143 Id. at 263.
144 Id. at 262.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 264-65.
147 Compare Barry, 961 F.2d at 263-265 (concluding thatjudge's remarks at a law school
were derived from ajudicial source, and so there was no disqualification under § 455(a))
with United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1024 (1st Cir. 1990) (determining comments
made at trial were not pertinent to § 455(a), and the judge should apply a reasonable
person test when disqualifying himself).
148 CompareJohnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981) (affirming extrajudicial limitation), with Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975
F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that the appearance of impartiality could be main-
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is subject to the limitation of the extrajudicial source doctrine. 49
This debate mirrors that among the state courts described earlier. 50
The split reflects contrasting interpretations of section 455(a) and
centers on whether the extrajudicial limitation in section 144 should
be incorporated with the disqualification standard under section
455 (a) and (b). The issue is whether the disqualification sections of
the Judicial Code, sections 144 and 455, should follow the same uni-
form standard of considering bias only if it derives from an extrajudi-
cial source.
Even in circuits limiting disqualification to bias derived from ex-
trajudicial sources, an exception exists. Although as a general rule
courtroom statements are not sufficient to justify disqualification ab-
sent extrajudicial bias, disqualification has been required when the
moving party can demonstrate "pervasive" bias.' 5 ' As discussed ear-
lier, pervasive bias need not be limited to personal animosity or be
grossly improper or prejudicial. 152 As long as the judge's remarks
within the judicial proceeding demonstrate that the trial judge had
pre-determined the outcome of the case, disqualification is war-
ranted. 5 3 Put in terms of the prior empirical research, the judge's
expectations for trial outcome must unfairly influence the outcome of
tained only if case was reassigned to another district court judge).
149 See United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (explaining that to be
disqualifying, judge's bias or prejudice must come from an extrajudicial source).
150 See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2724 (1994); United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 989 (1987); United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1174 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denie, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987); Davis v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1984).
This "pervasive bias" exception is similar to the same grounds for disqualification in state
courts. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
152 See King v. United States District Court, 16 F.d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt,
J., concurring); contra Davis, 734 F.2d at 1303.
153 King, 16 F.3d at 994-95. The King decision involved Rodney King's civil suit against
the City of Los Angeles for injuries resulting from his altercation with the city's police
officers. King sought the disqualification of the judge at the civil proceeding who had also
presided over the federal trial of the officers convicted of violating King's civil rights. King
sought recusai under § 455 (a) and provided evidence of "pervasive bias" in numerous rul-
ings and statements. King argued that the evidence showed that thejudge had firm convic-
tions regarding the factual issues underlying the civil claim. Examples of such statements
and rulings include his finding that the officers' offense was "de minimis," his statement
that King had "no serious injuries," his findings that one of the officers could reasonably
have believed that King was armed and dangerous, and that the incident would never have
developed to its final conclusion if not for King's initial misconduct. See King, 16 F.3d at
995. The Ninth Circuit ruled against granting mandamus to remove the judge. The con-
curring opinion stated that a review of the matter on direct appeal was necessary: "While
due to the unresolved nature of the law King's petition for mandamus relief may fall short
of the rigorous legal standard applicable in extraordinary writ proceedings, it raises a se-
rous legal question as to judge Davies' continued participation in the civil trial." Id. at 996.
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the case before disqualification is required.1 5 4
B. THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE IN LIGHT OF L.TEKY V. UNITED STA T_7S
1. Standards for Judicial Disqualification Under Liteky
The split among the circuits regarding the applicability of the ex-
trajudicial source doctrine to section 455 of the Judicial Code set the
stage for the Supreme Court to settle the interpretive question. In
Liteky v. United States,155 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, ex-
tended the application of the "extrajudicial source" doctrine, previ-
ously applied to motions brought under sections 144 and 455(b) (1),
to those brought under section 455(a).
156
The Court reasoned that under the extrajudicial source doctrine,
judicial rulings by themselves will "almost never" constitute a valid ba-
sis for disqualification on grounds of impartiality, bias, or preju-
dice. 15 7 Judicial rulings, stripped of surrounding comments or
accompanying opinions, cannot show reliance on an extrajudicial
source. In short, rulings provide grounds for appeal, not for judicial
disqualification. However, in rare cases of "pervasive bias," where a
judge's rulings display a degree of favoritism or antagonism that
makes fair judgment impossible, disqualification is merited.158
The Court explained that a judge's expressions of opinion
formed on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the
course of current or prior judicial proceedings similarly are not
grounds for disqualification, unless they reflect a "deep-seated favorit-
ism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." 159
Thus, judicial behavior during the course of a trial that is critical or
disapproving of or even hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases
154 See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
155 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994).
156 The Courtjustified its extending the doctrine on the basis that, first, the term "parti-
ality" in § 455(a) should have the equivalent "pejorative connotation" as the terms "bias"
and "prejudice" in §§ 144 and 455(b), including the equivalent consequence of importa-
tion of the extrajudicial source doctrine. Id. at 1155-56. Second, the Court found that it
would be "poor statutory construction" to apply the extrajudicial source doctrine to §§ 144
and 455(b) but not to § 455(a), because it would be unreasonable without any qualifying
language in the subsection to interpret § 455 (a) as implicitly eliminating a limitation ex-
plicitly contained in §455(b). Id.
157 Id. at 1157 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)). For
examples of this rule, see Rafferty v. Nynex Corp., 60 F.3d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (deny-
ing recusal motion based on judge's delay in ruling on motions and his unfavorable rul-
ings, including dismissal of five of plaintiffs six claims); Lechuga v. United States, No. 93-
1411, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4167, *3-4, (7th Cir. Feb. 28, 1995) (affirming trial judge's
refusal to grant defendant's motion for recusal based on the judge's familiarity with the
case and adverse decision on motion to suppress evidence used in his cocaine conviction).
158 114 S. Ct. at 1157. This is a question capable of future empirical study.
159 Id. (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)).
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ordinarily will not require disqualification. 160 A judge may be "ex-
ceedingly ill disposed towards a defendant, who has been shown to be
a thoroughly irresponsible person," but the judge's demeanor alone
would not be disqualifying unless the opinions derive from an extraju-
dicial source or were so severe as to preclude the judge from con-
ducting a fair and impartial trial. 16'
The Court emphasized that the central issue in examining
grounds for disqualification is not the source of ajudge's bias or prej-
udice. In other words, the majority in Liteky did not purport to adopt
a strict extrajudicial source requirement for disqualification motions
under section 455(a).162 Nor did the Court adopt a per se rule requir-
ing disqualification when evidence exists demonstrating that the
judge's partiality stems from an extrajudicial source. 163 Rather, the
Court explained that the key to understanding and applying the extra-
judicial source doctrine and its exception lies in the pejorative conno-
tations of the word "partiality" in section 455.164 Because "partiality"
connotes an inappropriate opinion, an opinion that is wrongful or
undeserved is disqualifying regardless of its source. 165
In practice, however, the extrajudicial or intrajudicial source of.
bias largely controls the disposition of disqualification motions. As
discussed earlier, if the source of bias is extrajudicial, the movant must
show that a reasonable person, aware of all the circumstances, might
doubt the judge's impartiality.166 Movants asserting intrajudical bias
160 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
161 Justice Scalia only discusses this "pervasive bias exception" to the extrajudicial source
requirement as it applies to §§ 144 and 455(b) (1). However, this "exception" exists when-
ever the extrajudicial source requirement is invoked. Therefore, although not explicitly
stated, the pervasive bias exception applies to motions brought under § 455(a) as well as
those under §§ 144 or 455(b). Bias may be classified as pervasive if it displays a "clear
inability to render fair judgment," even if it does not derive from an extrajudicial source.
One example of such intrajudicial behavior that has been found not to reflect this "high
degree of favoritism" is the involvement of the trial judge in interrupting and interrogating
witnesses for the prosecution and the defendant and in questioning the relevance of spe-
cific evidence prior to its admission on the record. See United States v. Castner, No. 93-
5641, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7626, *10-11, (4th Cir., April 5, 1995) (applying Litehy stan-
dard to judge's involvement in the presentation of testimony and evidence when court was
fulfilling its obligation to correct inadequate examinations and clarify factual issues).
162 Litey , 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
163 See United States v. Bogard, No. 94-50099, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 6082f, *3-4 (9th
Cir., March 22, 1995) (stating that the Supreme Court in Liteky reasoned that "... neither
the presence of an extrajudicial source establishes bias nor the absence of an extrajudicial
source necessarily precludes bias.").
164 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1155-57. See also United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d
Cir. 1994) (explaining that "the words 'extrajudicial bias' really are intended to convey the
notion of a 'wrongful or inappropriate' bias, regardless of whether the improper bias arises
from evidence adduced at trial or from some extraneous source").
165 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1155-57.
166 See e.g., United States v.Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
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claims must show that a reasonable observer would find that the judge
displayed a degree of antagonism or favoritism which would make fair
judgment impossible. 167 Thus the source of ajudge's impartiality has
a decisive bearing on whether disqualification is deemed necessary. 168
The Liteky opinion gives rise to several questions capable of em-
pirical study. One obvious question is exactly what extrajudicial
sources of bias would cause a "reasonable person" to doubt a judge's
impartiality. Another is precisely what intrajudicial conduct is so ex-
treme as to cause a reasonable person to conclude that fair judgment
is impossible. 169 In this regard, Liteky asserts that manifestations of
animosity must be "much more than subtle,"' 70 and thatjudicial stern-
ness and short temper in reaction to frustrations with courtroom ad-
ministration cannot be deemed disqualifying.' 71 Although empirical
research may not produce clear, bright-line answers to these ques-
tions, in part because the reasonable person test is flexible and fact-
controlled, empirical study of these questions may further discussion
of these issues and help to clarify future standards for assessing "post-
Liteky" section 455 claims, a topic to which I now turn.
2. Post-Liteky Treatment of Section 455 Claims
Circuit court opinions since Liteky that address section 455 claims
illuminate recent conceptions of the appearance ofjustice.'7 2 As illus-
trated by the cases that follow, treatment of intrajudicial and extraju-
Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (10th Cir. 1994); El Fenix de Puerto Rico v.Johanny, 36
F.3d 136, 140 (1st Cir. 1994). See also supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
167 United States v. Williams, No. 95-0179, 1995 WL 434581 *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. July 24,
1995); Blanche Rd. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1995).
168 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1155.
169 This issue is the central question in United States v. Antar, Nos. 94-5228, 94-5230,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 8083 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 1995), which is discussed infra notes 191-204.
170 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1158 n.3.
171 Id. at 1157.
172 Judicial disqualification issues also arise when claimants assert due process claims.
Section 455 analysis does not apply to due process claims because federal judges do not
have the authority to impose federal judicial disqualification standards on state court
judges accused of unconstitutional judicial bias. See Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1479-80
(10th Cir. 1994); Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1378 (7th Cir.
1994). In addition, a finding ofjudicial bias sufficient to establish a due process violation
rarely results from a mere appearance of impropriety. Thus, any claim that fails under
§ 455 should fail also under due process. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,
820-21 (1986) ("Only in the most extreme cases would disqualification [on the basis of
appearance of bias] be constitutionally required"); Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Correc-
tions, 31 F.3d at 1378 ("[B]ad appearances alone should not require disqualification to
prevent an unfair trial"); Diaz v. Botet, 182 B.R 654, 661 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1995) ("[N]ot
every case ofjudicial disqualification rises to the level of a Constitutional challenge"). But
see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text for a discussion ofjudicial opinions finding
due process violations solely on the basis of appearance of bias).
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dicial bias claims under the Liteky reasonable person standard varies
greatly. This variation, combined with the fact-intensive nature of
these decisions, suggests the need for additional empirical study to




The presence of an extrajudicial source of alleged bias increases
the risk of an appearance of impropriety. Therefore, parties seeking
to recuse a judge for extrajudicial bias must show only that a reason-
able person, aware of the relevant circumstances, might harbor
doubts about the judge's impartiality. Consistent with Liteky, this test,
as applied by the federal courts, has proven less difficult to satisfy than
recusal motions based on intrajudicial bias.
In United States v. Greenspan,174 for example, the Tenth Circuit
held that a judge who had received death threats from a criminal de-
fendant should have recused himself under section 455 from sentenc-
ing that defendant. In Greenspan, the FBI informed the presiding
judge, prior to sentencing, that the defendant was a participant in a
multi-state conspiracy to kill the judge and his family. Instead of re-
cusing himself, the judge expedited sentencing, and explained the
need to "get [the defendant] into the federal penitentiary system im-
mediately, where he can be monitored more closely."' 75 In addition,
the judge refused to grant the defendant a continuance, even though
the defendant's new attorney was appointed just two days before the
revised sentencing date.176
The court of appeals concluded that the judge's rulings alone
would not have been a sufficient basis for recusal. However, in light of
the judge's extrajudicial knowledge of the death threat, a reasonable
person might question whether the judge could be impartial in sen-
tencing the defendant. 177 The court emphasized, in part to ward off
future judge-shopping, that had the record indicated the threat was
merely a ploy to obtain a new judge, recusal would have been
173 See infra notes 235-50 (proposing future empirical studies relating to § 455 and the
reasonable person standard).
174 26 F.d 1001 (10th Cir. 1994).
175 Id. at 1005.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1006. Cf. CR 95-110-A, 1995 WL 606949 (10th Cir., filed Sept. 27, 1995).
(Oklahoma City bombing defendant Terry Nichols' pending petition for writ of manda-
mus recusing the assigned district judge and all other judges in the Western District of
Oklahoma). Counsel for Nichols rely heavily on Greenspan in their petition for recusal.
For a discussion of appearance ofjustice issues raised by the Oklahoma City bombing case,




Similarly, in United States v. Jordan,1 79 the Fifth Circuit granted the
defendant's section 455 motion for recusal on the basis of extrajudi-
cial bias. The defendant, convicted of wire fraud and money launder-
ing, had an extremely hostile relationship with the trial judge's close
personal friend of twenty-two years, Michael Wood. The animosity be-
tween Wood and the defendant stemmed from Wood's previous ap-
pointment as a receiver for the defendant's trucking company. The
hostility escalated during the course of the relationship and
culminated in the defendant having Wood arrested for assault. Wood
was represented in that matter by the trial judge's husband, who was
also Wood's former law partner. The court of appeals held that
whether or not the trial judge was aware of the extent of the discord
between the defendant and Wood, a reasonable person could ques-
tion the judge's impartiality.18
In contrast to cases like Greenspan and Jordan, some claims of ex-
trajudicial bias do not meet the relatively low threshold established by
the Liteky test. In United States v. Williams,'18 for example, a defendant
convicted of several counts of making false statements in connection
with purchasing firearms alleged that the trial judge was biased
against him because the judge's son had previously been murdered by
gunshot during a completely unrelated felony. In denying the section
455 recusal motion, the trial judge explained that no reasonable third
party observer could conclude from the judge's personal experience
with violent crime that he would be biased against this particular de-
fendant. Since all judges bring personal histories and experiences to
the bench, 182 the court concluded that remote or speculative connec-
tions between those experiences and litigants or criminal defendants
178 Greenspan, 26 F.3d at 1006.
179 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995).
180 Id. at 156. The court acknowledged that judges are less likely than the reasonable
third party observer to harbor doubts about their own impartiality and that of fellow
judges, but noted judges must examine the situation from the perspective of a reasonable
third party who is not a judge. Id. at 156-57. Study of this issue is required.
Early in its opinion, the court emphasized the fact-bound nature of § 455 claims:
"[El ach § 455(a) case is extremely fact intensive and fact bound, and must bejudged on its
unique facts and circumstances, more than by comparison to situations considered in prior
jurisprudence." Id. at 157. Later, the court criticized the dissent's attempt to place Fifth
Circuit judicial disqualification cases in a continuum: "[W]e see nothing more than a
parsing of our prior cases into two pots, one containing those cases in which an appear-
ance of impartiality was found and the other containing those cases in which such appear-
ance was not found. That is certainly no 'continuum'; just an inventory exercise." Id. at
158 n.9.
181 No. 95-0179, 1995 WL 434581 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1995).
182 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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by themselves should not be adequate grounds for recusal. 183
The First Circuit similarly denied a recusal motion in El Fenix de
Puerto Rico v. Johanny,'84 which arose out of a dispute between a yacht
owner and his insurer over the cause of a shipwreck that occurred in
the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. Much of the information
presented at trial was highly technical expert evidence regarding
whether the insured had scuttled his yacht. The court rejected the
expert testimony offered by the insurer and found the sinking was an
accident.
The trial judge inJohanny had invited a friend, Bob Fisher, to view
the trial. Fisher was a "local yachtsman well versed in maritime mat-
ters" 1 5 and a "boat aficionado."186 Early in the trial, Fisher told one
of the insurer's witnesses that the judge requested he attend the trial
and listen to the evidence.' 87 On the basis of Fisher's presence and
the judge's subsequent rejection of the insurer's expert evidence, the
insurer moved to have the presiding judge recused. The judge ex-
plained he had invited Fisher and his wife to view the trial only be-
cause they might find it interesting; nonetheless, the judge
disqualified himself. When the insured moved for reconsideration,
the judge vacated the recusal order and reinstated his earlier decision
in favor of the insured.
On appeal, the First Circuit rejected the insurer's claim that dis-
qualification was warranted under section 455. In reaching that con-
clusion, the court of appeals emphasized that the lack of facts
supporting a finding of partiality and the absence of a factual basis for
recusal undermined the recusal motion. According to the court, the
only plausible reason for recusal was the "possible appearance of
impartiality.' 88
183 Widliams, 1995 WL 484581 at *1. The court considered the defendant's accusation of
intrajudicial bias separately. For an analysis of the court's consideration, see infra notes
212-14 and accompanying text.
184 86 F.3d 136 (1994).
185 Id. at 138.
186 Id. at 139.
187 Id. at 188-39.
188 Id. at 140. In addition, the court referred to the insurer's allegation as an "un-
founded innuendo." Id. TheJohanny court required that movants demonstrate more than
a "possible appearance of partiality." Id. The type and level of proof that would have
satisfied the court is unclear. The court concluded the judge's request that an expert
friend attend the trial and his subsequent decision to reject the insurer's technical expert
evidence did not merit recusal. Accordingly, to satisfy the court that recusal was warranted,
movants would have had to produce proof that the judge asked his friend for an opinion
or proof that the judge considered that opinion in rendering his opinion. Thus, the First
Circuit seemed to require some proof of actual bias, contrary to the Liteky test's focus on
the appearance of impropriety.




To require recusal on the basis of intrajudicial bias, a movant
must show that a reasonable person could find the trial judge dis-
played behavior to such a high degree of antagonism or favoritism as
to preclude a fair trial.'8 9 The circuit courts have applied this excep-
tion narrowly to the extrajudicial source doctrine. 90 United States v.
Antar'9 1 is a rare example of a post-Liteky decision that required
recusal on the basis of intrajudicial bias alone.
In Antar, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought a civil
action against Antar, the president and chairman of the board of
Crazy Eddie, Inc., a consumer electronics store chain. 192 Six months
later, the United States District Court for NewJersey entered a default
judgment against Antar and ordered him to disgorge more than $52
million dollars, the amount the court determined Antar had illegally
profited from the sale of stock in Crazy Eddie, Inc.1
9 3
In June 1992, a federal grand jury indicted Antar and three
others on various racketeering and fraud charges. Antar was later
convicted on all counts in the indictment. The trial judge sentenced
Antar to 151 months in prison and ordered him to make restitution in
the amount of $121 million. 9 4 Antar appealed the conviction and the
sentence, arguing that the trial judge was biased against him and
should have recused himself sua sponte from the criminal trial. Antar
based this allegation on a statement the judge made to the United
States Attorney during the sentencing hearing: "My object in this case
from day one has always been to get back to the public that which was
taken from it as a result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant
jurisdiction, may clarify Johanny's requirement of a sufficient factual basis for recusal. In
Diaz, a bankruptcy defendant sought recusal of the judge on both intrajudicial and extraju-
dicial grounds. The court explained that because § 455 claims turn on whether a reason-
able third party aware of all the facts would question the judge's impartiality, "it is crucial
that the facts which might cause a reasonable observer to question impartiality are identi-
fied." Id. at 659. Although the Johanny court did not frame the issue this way, the court
may have insisted the movant present stronger proof of inappropriate behavior to establish
"facts which might cause a reasonable observer to question impartiality" rather than to
establish actual bias.
189 See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text (describing empirical studies ofjudges'
behavior and the appearance ofjustice).
190 See Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157 (explaining that intrajudicial bias will rarely be disqualify-
ing); United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 574 (3d Cir. 1995).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 570.
193 Id. at 571-72. Before the default was entered, Antar had fled the country. He was
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and others."195
The Third Circuit concluded that a reasonable person could find
the trial judge's behavior and comments atAntar's sentencing hear-
ing displayed favoritism or antagonism sufficiently strong to make a
fair trial impossible. A reasonable person could conclude from the
trial judge's statements that his goal from the outset of the criminal
trial was to restore large amounts of money to parties the defendant
had allegedly harmed. Indeed, a criminal conviction of the defendant
would have substantially advanced this goal. 196 Thus, the Third Cir-
cuit held that a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances,
could conclude that this goal sufficiently influenced the judge's rul-
ings so as to make a fair trial impossible. The appellate court there-
fore reversed the convictions and remanded the action for a new trial
with a different presiding judge. 97
The Third Circuit acknowledged Liteky's holding, that biased re-
marks arising during judicial proceedings must be "particularly strong
in order to merit recusal,"'98 and noted that other courts have nar-
rowly construed Liteky's exception to the extrajudicial source doc-
trine. 199 The court expressed concern that, although Liteky did not
require recusal of a judge who had formed an opinion of a person
based on knowledge gained in earlier proceedings, "when ajudge has
formed opinions during a civil case, he or she certainly must be care-
ful not to have those beliefs influence his or her goal in the criminal
case."200
In contrast to Antar, other courts have declined to require recusal
in situations that arguably demonstrate a high degree of intrajudicial
prejudice, thereby highlighting the varied results produced by the rea-
sonable person test In United States v. Young,201 for example, the
Tenth Circuit did not require recusal of ajudge who made statements
that arguably exhibited extreme prejudice against a criminal defend-
ant 20 2 The defendant in Young had been indicted on three counts of
money laundering and one count of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine. During the trial, the court rejected the defend-
195 Id. at 573-74.
196 Id. at 577.
197 Id. at 579.
198 Id. at 574.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 578.
201 45 F.3d 1405 (loth Cir. 1995).
202 But seeAntar, 53 F.3d at 575 (distinguishing that case from Youngon grounds that the
judge in Young merely predicted what the jury would find, whereas the judge in Antar




ant's guilty plea for failure to admit all the elements of the crime. The
jury convicted the defendant of two counts of money laundering and
sentenced her to seventy months in prison. The defendant appealed
the conviction on several grounds, including the trial judge's refusal
to disqualify himself. The defendant grounded her section 455 mo-
tion on a remark the judge made to her attorney at a pretrial schedul-
ing conference:
[T]he obvious thing that's going to happen to [the defendant] is that
she's going to get convicted, and then they're going to sprinkle her and bless
her with immunity, and then she's going to get to testify. And then she's
going to pull the same act on me again, and then she's going to the
countyjail for at least 30 days for contempt. And we'll do that as often as
necessary until she starts talking.... All I'm telling you is that's the
preview of coming attractions.203
In affirming the trial judge's decision, the court of appeals held
that the judge's comment was, at worst, a mere prediction and may
even have been intended to give the defendant strategic advice on
amending her guilty plea to meet the pleading requirements. Accord-
ing to the Tenth Circuit, nothing in the judge's comment showed an
unwillingness or inability to handle the case impartially. As a result,
the defendant's recusal motion was held to have been properly
denied. 204
The Eighth Circuit likewise rejected a defendant's claim of in-
trajudicial bias and corresponding recusal motion in In re Larson.20 5
In Larson the defendant sought removal of a district court judge from
a criminal proceeding arising from the defendant's discovery of a fos-
silized Tyrannosaurus Rex that the government alleged was illegally
collected. After two years of pretrial proceedings, the media an-
nounced that the government and the defendants had concluded a
plea bargain. The trial judge, who had handled the case from its in-
ception and who was currently presiding over a related civil action,
heard news of the alleged plea bargain and announced in a letter to
the parties that he would oppose any plea bargain, especially the one
reported in the newspaper.20 6 The defendants filed a motion for
recusal on grounds that the trial judge was biased due to his long term
involvement with the case.20 7
The trial judge denied the motion, and thereafter the defendant
petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court found recusal
unnecessary, since a reasonable person, knowing that the trial judge
203 Young, 45 F.3d at 1414 (emphasis added).
204 Id. at 1416.
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had been involved for a long time in the criminal prosecution and
had presided over a civil action involving many of the same parties
and issues, "would not view these isolated remarks as an occasion for
concern." 208 In effect, the defendant did not demonstrate that a rea-
sonable person could find such animus or favoritism as to make fair
judgment impossible.
20 9
Two other post-Liteky trial court cases provide illustrations of
judges denying motions to recuse grounded on alleged intrajudicial
bias. In Diaz v. Botet,210 the defendant in a bankruptcy action moved
for recusal when the trial judge described him as a "bon vivant" dur-
ing the trial. The judge denied the section 455 motion, reasoning
that calling the defendant a "bon vivant" did not exhibit animosity or
favoritism that would make a fair trial impossible. Not only did the
evidence of the defendant's extravagant lifestyle presented at trial cor-
roborate this description of the defendant, but also this description
was arguably complimentary.
21'
In United States v. Williams,212 the defendant also sought recusal of
the trial judge for alleged intrajudicial bias. The defendant asserted
that comments the judge made during a plea hearing in response to
defendant's extrajudicial bias concerns indicated intrajudicial bias.
213
The trial judge denied the motion to recuse, concluding that any rea-
sonable person who read the transcript would recognize that his state-
ment did not demonstrate deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.
Rather, the judge stated that his comments intended to ensure that
the defendant was aware of his right to request recusal.
2 14
208 Id. at 414.
209 Id. at 416.
210 182 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1995).
211 Id. at 660.
212 No. 95-0179, 1995 WL 434581 (E.D.Pa. July 24, 1995).
213 Those comments included: "I hope, too, my personal life does not visit me in my
sentencing, but if that's a concern of your client, then" maybe you ought to let him have an
opportunity and you can talk with him and in fact, I will take a break now and if he says 'I
want you, Mr. DeStefano, to file a motion for recusal', we'll continue this matter and we'll
see how I rule on it." Id. at *2.
214 Id. Numerous other cases involve intrajudicial bias claims that failed to meet the
Liteky test See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying
request to disqualify judge who sought outside information in deciding whether to accept
defendant's plea bargain); Grodon v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1053 (2d Cir.
1995) (finding judge's statement, made during Lanham Act trial, that no theory of the
Kennedy assassination is universally accepted was insufficient to require recusal); Rafferty
v. Nynex Corp., 60 F.3d 844, 847-48 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding unfavorable rulings did not
demonstrate judicial bias); Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 266
(3d Cir. 1994) (concludingjudge's comments during trial expressing impatience and frus-
tration with the plaintiff and its attorneys were not disqualifying under § 455); United
States v. Bertoli, 40 F.d 1884, 1412-13 (3d Cir. 1994) (refusing to disqualify judge who
made unfavorable rulings and reprimanded the defendant and his attorneys on several
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c. Extrajudicial and Intrajudicial Bias
In several cases courts have required recusal on the basis of both
intrajudicial and extrajudicial bias. For example, the D.C. Circuit or-
dered the recusal of a presiding district judge for exhibiting in-
trajudicial and extrajudicial bias in United States v. Microsoft Corp.2 15 In
Microsoft, the Department of Justice brought an antitrust action alleg-
ing that Microsoft had been using 'per processor' licenses and restric-
tive nondisclosure agreements to deter competition.21 6  The
Department of Justice subsequently entered into a consent decree
with Microsoft that prohibited Microsoft from engaging in these two
anticompetitive practices and filed the decree with the court.
Throughout the proceedings, the trial judge introduced into the
trial issues outside the scope of either the complaint or the consent
decree. On several occasions the judge questioned the attorneys
about allegations made in the book Hard Drive,217 focusing on the
book's allegation that Microsoft employed "vaporware."218 The judge
also accepted ex parte submissions from the defendant's accusers, al-
lowing one accuser to remain anonymous. Moreover, the judge made
several comments during trial indicating dislike for and distrust of
Microsoft and Microsoft's attorneys.
219
The court of appeals directed that a new trial judge be assigned
to the case on remand, determining that the judge's repeated refer-
ences to vaporware "contaminated" his review of the case. These ref-
erences, the appellate court reasoned, made it clear that the judge's
acceptance of the accusations in the book Hard Drive resulted in his
expansive inquiries.220 Taken together, the improper references, the
judge's favorable treatment of Microsoft's accusers, and his disparag-
ing remarks concerning the defendant and its attorneys led the appel-
late court to rule that a reasonable observer could question the
occasions); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting bias
claim founded on judge's finding, twelve years prior to the present criminal trial, that the
same defendant was incompetent to stand trial on other criminal charges).
215 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Although the recusal motion in
Microsoft was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, the court analogized that statute to § 455,
and applied § 455 precedent in deciding the motion. Id. at 1463, nn.1-2.
216 Id. at 1452-53.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1463. Thejudge stated, for example, "[y]ou see, what you have to explain to
me is why not if these other practices-say while we're cleaning up this mess, why don't we
also take care of-you must agree that vaporware is a problem .... " "Vaporware" de-
scribes Microsoft's alleged practice of publicly announcing new computer devices while in
the production stages solely to deter consumers from purchasing competitor's products
that are currently (or will be imminently) on the market. Id. at 1453.
219 Id. at 1464.
220 Id. at 1463.
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judge's impartiality.221
The Fourth Circuit, in Hathcock v. Navistar International Transpor-
tation Corp., similarly upheld a claim of disqualifying bias based on
intrajudicial and extrajudicial sources. 222 Concerning the former, the
judge issued a default order against the defendant that allegedly had
been drafted by the plaintiffs counsel. Although the judge submitted
an affidavit in response to the recusal motion in which the judge ad-
mitted that plaintiffs counsel had drafted the factual portion of the
default order, the judge insisted he had arrived at independent legal
conclusions.
Concerning the extrajudicial source of bias, the defendant al-
leged that while a trial on damages in the instant action was underway,
the judge made several public derogatory remarks about tort defend-
ants and their attorneys. In particular the defendant alleged that the
judge said: "[Elvery defense lawyer objects to the net worth coming in
[on the issue of punitive damages].... Then after the verdict you can
get up there and call them the son-of-a-bitches that they really are."223
The court of appeals held that a reasonable person could con-
clude from these facts that the judge could not decide the case impar-
tially. The appellate court reasoned that, by itself, the judge's request
that plaintiff's counsel draft the default order may not have justified
recusal. However, viewed in conjunction with the judge's personal in-
volvement in opposing the recusal motion and the apparent prejudice
against tort defendants exhibited during his speech, recusal under
section 455 was warranted.22
4
A final example of recusal based on intrajudicial and extrajudicial
bias occurred in In re International Business Machines Corp (IBM).225 In
IBM, the Second Circuit ordered the district judge to recuse himself
from presiding over a civil antitrust action brought by the United
States against IBM in 1952.226 The 1952 action ended in a consent
decree which the parties amended in 1956. Nothing further occurred
regarding that action until 1994, when IBM filed two motions: the first
requesting termination of the consent decree as amended; the second
requesting recusal of the presiding judge. The judge denied the
221 Id. at 1465.
222 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 1995).
223 Id. at 39. In that same speech he commented: "What makes [these pro-plaintiff
decisions] so great is that the lawyers that represent these habitual defendants, they met
these three decisions with about the same degree ofjoy and enthusiasm as the fatted calf
did when it found out the prodigal son was coming home. That indicates that that's some
pretty good decisions." Id.
224 Id. at 41.
225 45 F.8d 641 (2d Cir. 1995).
226 Id. at 644.
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recusal motion, and IBM filed for a writ of mandamus. 227
A related action involving the same parties and the same judge
played a central role in the recusal motion and the Second Circuit's
ultimate decision. The United States had brought a second antitrust
civil action against IBM in 1969. Seven years later, while this trial on
liability was in progress, the United States agreed to a dismissal, with
the parties stipulating that the government had determined the case
was without merit.228 Several actions by the presiding judge in the
aftermath of the stipulated dismissal formed the basis for IBM's mo-
tion for recusal in 1994: the judge criticized the government's deci-
sion to dismiss the case; refused motions to dispose of copious pages
of documents accumulated during the litigation; indicated that he
might reject the dismissal pursuant to the provisions of the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act;229 and gave numerous interviews in the
press concerning developments in the case. 23
0
The Second Circuit granted IBM's recusal motion, concluding
that a reasonable observer, fully informed of the circumstances sur-
rounding the judge's refusal to dismiss the 1969 case when both par-
ties had agreed to dismiss, could question the judge's continuing
ability to impartially handle the 1952 case.231 The court of appeals
held that Liteky did not preclude judicial rulings from serving as a ba-
sis for recusal.23 2 It concluded that a reasonable person could ques-
tion the judge's impartiality regarding whether to dismiss the 1956
consent decree and granted mandamus relief 23 3 In so doing, the
court acknowledged that the Liteky decision did not establish a "bright
line" test for extrajudicial source criteria in judicial disqualification
analysis. 23 4 The future study of judicial disqualification and its rela-
227 Id. at 642.
228 Id. at 643.
229 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h) (1988).
230 In re International Business Machines, 45 F.3d at 642.
231 Id. at 643.
232 Id. at 644.
233 Id. at 643.
234 Based on a review of state and federal cases as of November 1995, the issue of non-
verbal expressions of bias has not yet arisen under a Liteky analysis. Analysis of a bias claim
based on nonverbal behavior, however, should proceed as one for claims founded on rela-
tionships or verbal expressions. First, the court should determine whether the source of
the alleged bias underlying the behavior is extrajudicial or intrajudicial. If the source is
extrajudicial, the court should assess whether a reasonable person would doubt the impar-
tiality of the judge displaying that behavior. If intrajudicial, the court should evaluate
whether a reasonable person viewing the behavior would conclude it exhibited such a high
degree of bias as to preclude fair judgment. Cf U.S. v. Edmund, 52 F.3d 1080, 1101-03
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157, discussion of defendant's due process
claim that judge's comments, facial expressions, gestures and tone of voice demonstrated
bias).
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tion to the appearance ofjustice is the final issue to which I now turn.
C. FUTURE STUDY OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR AND THE APPEARANCE OF
JUSTICE
Two general areas relating to the appearance of justice call out
for future empirical study. First, as mentioned above, empirical inves-
tigation of the actual workings of various judicial tests and standards
(e.g., disqualification standards) is needed. Second, examination of
the relation of nonjudicial factors, such as evidentiary factors and me-
dia coverage in high profile trials, to the appearance of justice must
be examined.
With regard to the first line of study, the Liteky Court's adoption
of the extrajudicial source doctrine raises at least two immediate ques-
tions capable of empirical study relating to recent judicial treatment
of bias claims. First, what specific degree of measurable bias satisfies
the legal sufficiency test for a reasonable person having doubts about
a presiding judge's impartiality? Second, what measureable judicial
behavior could lead a reasonable person (or a sitting judge) to con-
clude that a fair trial is "impossible?" Systematic study of these and
related issues may further the understanding of the reasonableness of
a proposed disqualification determination based on particular
behaviors.23 5
Regarding the second line of study, future research on judicial
disqualification in the federal courts under the Liteky test is also war-
ranted23 6 Research may concentrate on delineating the boundaries
of the "impossible to have a fair trial test" by analyzing how federal
courts in practice mark the limits of acceptable intrajudicial behaviors
when prejudicial remarks are reflected in the record.23 7 Once deline-
235 In the Iowa studies, independent observers of trials reported that they "knew bias"
when they saw it. See Blanck, The Measure of the Judge, supra note 29, at 679-80. Courts and
commentators have recognized the usefulness of empirical studies in evaluating how the
"reasonable person" would react to certain situations. Cf U.S. v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1508
(10th Cir. 1994) (Logan, J., dissenting) (illegal seizure claim); Stuart L. Bass, The "Reason-
able Woman" Standard: The Ninth Circuit Decrees Sexes Perceive Differently, 43 LAB. LJ. 449 n.13
(1992) (sexual harassment claim). See also Toni P. Lester, The Yankee Woman in King Ar-
thur s Court-What the United States and United Kingdom Can Learn From Each Other About
Sexual Harrassment, 17 B.C. INr'L & COMP. L. Rxv. 233, 254 (1994) (arguingjudges should
look to statistical research and expert testimony in applying the reasonable person test to
sexual harassment claims).
236 The contours of such a test are outlined through an illustration provided by the
Court in Liteky. In indicating the limits of non-prejudicial intrajudicial behavior, the Court
referred to a statement by a judge in a World War I espionage case involving German-
American defendants, 114 S. Ct at 1157 (quoting Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22
(1921)), see supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
237 See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981) (judge's on-record
remarks reflected personal prejudice against defendant for successfully appealing his con-
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ated, the elements of such a test may emerge and be identified as
variables incorporated in existing or new research designs on the ap-
pearance of justice.
23 8
Empirical studies could also furnish insight into appearance of
justice concerns regarding situations that frequently present the occa-
sion for seeking judicial disqualification, for example, in sentencing
proceedings, and in new trials after remand from an appellate court.
Although a presiding judge is often in the best position to determine
an appropriate sentence for a convicted criminal defendant, the ap-
pearance ofjustice requires that discretionary sentencing be exercised
by ajudge without a "hint of animosity" toward the defendant.23 9 Sim-
ilarly, empirical studies of the relationship between allegedly biased
judicial behavior, as well as the verdicts and sentencing patterns in
new trials after remand, may provide valuable guidance for deciding
whether certain circumstances foster a reasonable belief in the judge's
inability to act in an impartial manner.
In addition, research may focus on determining what the general
public perceives as factors in the tainting of the appearance ofjustice.
Real world and mock studies that present various scenarios involving
extrajudicial bias sources and intrajudical behavior indicating bias
could be distributed to a cross-section of society. Analysis of the re-
sponses could help guide courts considering bias claims by highlight-
ing factors widely perceived as indicating bias. As mentioned in
section II, the Iowa Study indicated that nonverbal judicial behavior
alone sometimes can predict trial outcomes and sentencing patterns.
Study is needed of the type and form of particular nonverbal expres-
sions of bias which the public perceives as making a fair trial
impossible.
Additional study of the strength and quality of the evidence
presented at trial and its relation to the appearance of justice and
judicial behavior is needed as well. As the California and Iowa empiri-
cal studies suggest, the moderating behaviors of judges, combined
with evidentiary strength, may be especially predictive .of trial out-
comes. 24 Further research is required to understand the combined
and independent effects ofjudicial and extrajudicial sources necessary
to adhere to the reach of Liteky.
viction on basis of judge's actions during prior trial; remarks were sufficient to require
judge's disqualification for partiality under § 455(a)).
238 See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text (research framework in California and
Iowa studies).
239 See Commonwealth v. Darush, 459 A.2d 727 (Pa. 1983) (requiring sentencing by a
judge whose "impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned"). Cf supra note 174-78 and
accompanying text (discussing Greenspan and recusal in sentencing hearing).
240 See Blanck, Judges' Behavior, supra note 12, at 119-36.
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Other related questions require systematic study. To what extent
does the strength of the evidence alone predict verdicts in higher ver-
sus lower complexity trials, or in higher versus lower media profile
cases? The degree to which evidence is the primary "engine ofjustice"
regardless of the appearance ofjustice remains an open question for
future study.241
In addition, researchers may attempt to identify other sources
that influence judicial decision-making in high profile cases. One
such pervasive topic in the general public's eye today is the role of the
appearance of justice in highly publicized criminal cases.2 42 Expan-
sive and unprecedented media coverage in recent high profile crimi-
nal cases-cases involving the Menendez brothers, William Kennedy
Smith, Rodney King, OJ. Simpson, Mike Tyson, and others-have fo-
cused public attention on satisfying the appearance of and actual jus-
tice.245 Professor Paul Robinson commented at the Conference that
in high profile cases the disparity between the appearance of justice
and actual justice is often exaggerated.244 High profile cases tend to
be those cases in which the system "does not tend to work well...
[where the public] focus[es] on the unusual, [the] bizarre cases, the
cases gone wrong, the distortion effect that comes with the media cov-
erage."245 The appearance of justice is distorted and presented in
ways different from "the 99 burglary cases that come to trial and the
person gets what they deserve."246
Attorney Leslie Abramson also commented at the Conference
that in the O.J. Simpson case, presiding 'Judge Ito's obvious concern
[was] not just with the appearance of justice, but with [actual] jus-
tice."247 Study is needed, therefore, of media portrayals of the appear-
ance of justice, as well as actual justice, in high profile versus low
profile cases. 248 In addition, the impact of the media on judge and
241 See, e.g., MichaelJ. Saks, The Limits of ScientificJury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 12
JuimMFTRicsJ. 3, 22 (1976).
242 See, e.g., the research on extralegal influences on jury decision making, in David T.
Wasserman & J. Neil Robinson, Extra-legal Influences, Group Processes, and Jury Decision-mak-
ing: A Psychological Perspectiv 12 N.C. CENTRAL LJ. 96 (1980).
243 See Marla Sandys & Steve M. Chermak, Ajourney into the Unknown: The Effects of
Pretrial Publicity on Capital Cases (1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
244 Conference Proceedings, supra note 7, at 28.
245 Id. at 28.
246 Id. at 28.
247 Id. at 88.
248 The appearance ofjustice has become increasingly important in light of the exten-
sive media coverage given trials of major public interest. Because of the high visibility of
such cases, they have the potential to shapejudicial and popular notions of the appearance
of justice.
The Oklahoma City bombing case, U.S. v. McVeigh, provides an example of a well-
publicized trial that raises appearance of justice issues. In that case, defendants Terry
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jury decision-making, the use of jury sequestration, and the appear-
ance of justice is capable of future study.
Another equally important area requiring study is the impact of
our increasingly multi-cultural society on conceptions of the appear-
ance ofjustice and fairness in the courtroom. At the Conference, Dr.
Florence Keller commented that we can no longer conduct trials in
traditional ways and believe that a defendant can get "a fair hearing
from people whose cultures are so different, whose symbols are so op-
posite. '249 To believe that our system ofjustice can provide a defend-
ant "a fair hearing without knowing more about the cultures, more
about our juries, and more about how to relate to these juries, is to do
a disservice to our system ofjustice and to the defendant ' 250 Empiri-
cal study of diverging views of the appearance ofjustice from a multi-
cultural and multi-ethnic view point is needed.
IV. CONCLUSION
George Everson's 1919 article in this Journal continued a tradi-
tion of analysis and discussion, perhaps more important than ever
before, of the concept of the appearance of justice. At the Appear-
ance of Justice Conference, Professor Paul Robinson spoke of this
dialogue:
We need to have a criminal justice system which speaks with moral au-
thority, which means it has to have the appearance of fairness ....
That's one part of making law more powerful-by increasing its appear-
ance of doing justice.2
51
The ultimate authority of the judiciary is derived from the faith
that society places in the fairness and impartiality ofjudges presiding
in our courts. In a day of ever increasing public awareness and media
coverage of courtroom trials, the "appearance of justice," to para-
Nichols and Timothy McVeigh sought recusal of districtJudge Alley under §§ 144, 455 (a)
and 455(b), because the impact of the April 1995 bombing of the federal building in
Oklahoma City reached and severely damaged the nearby federal courthouse. In addition,
several courthouse employees, including some judges, sustained injuries or lost relatives as
a result of the explosion. Finally, the defendants alleged the general atmosphere at the
courthouse was one of anger and hurt, as evidenced by the circulation at the courthouse of
pamphlets, t-shirts and videos relating to the bombing disaster.
Although the government recommended voluntary recusal of all Western District of
Oklahoma judges, Judge Alley denied defendants' recusal motion, noting that he was not
personally acquainted with any of the bombing victims and that the damage to the court-
house had not impeded normal courtroom functioning. U.S. v. McVeigh, No. CR 95-110-
A, 1995 WL 558992 (WD. Okla. Sept. 14, 1995). Defendant Nichols petitioned the Tenth
Circuit for a writ of mandamus recusing Judge Alley and all other judges in the Western
District of Oklahoma. CR 95-110-A, 1995 WL 606949 (10th Cir., filed Sept. 27, 1995).
249 Conference Proceedings, supra note 7, at 35.
250 Id. at 35.
251 Id. at 29.
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phraseJustice Frankfurter, is more important than ever before to gen-
erate public feelings that justice has been done.
